Disrespectful reflections about Afghanistan made by Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan at the recent Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting were an personality to the Afghan nation reeling from the Taliban preemption. In his reflections, Khan described thenon-monolithic Taliban group as a predominately ethnical Pashtun movement, implicitly casting millions of Pashtuns as the Taliban’s votaries. The high minister, meanwhile, said girls’ education is contrary to Afghan values and went on to bandy “ Islamophobia” in the West — an epiphenomenon apparently linked to the recent exile affluence, which Khan wants to support as a rescuer.

For Pakistani leaders, similar advised jeremiads are no accident. These recreating talking points are reflective of Pakistan’s long- running designs to produce a new, false narrative aboutpost-American Afghanistan. With the Taliban’s palm, Pakistan no longer makes secret what it wants in Afghanistan, a country which Islamabad now treats as an extension of Pakistan.

But comprehensions matter. For decades, Pakistan has maintained a particular seductiveness for engagement with violent Islamist movements. The three Ms – mullahs, military and zealots – have effectively commandeered the progressive vision of Pakistan’s author, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, turning Pakistan into a de facto Islamic state with religion and military poisoning the state outfit.

In the 1980s, General Zia-ul-Haq, also-military oppressor- turned- chairman, enabled the Islamization of Pakistan’s service, which continues to this day. In fact, jihad, which forms a foundational element of the Pakistan army’s credo (Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabil Allah or Faith, Piety, Jihad in the path of God) has been a pivotal part of state testament.

Under Khan moment, there’s a new academy of military thinking in which Pakistani leaders are openly reclaiming the state’s Islamic credentials and are unapologetically buttressing Pakistan’s Islamization docket. Yet, with unreasonableness resurging in the country, there’s a visible gap between the deep state’s intentions and the amenability of millions of original Pakistanis to accept such an assessed identity.

Also, inside Afghanistan, Pakistan’s deep state is on an systematized march to transfigure the Taliban into”Talibanism” — a poisonous mix of cold-blooded Deobandi testament and a customized set of beliefs fused superficially together by Islamic Sharia. As similar, Pakistan has constantly validated the Taliban as a vanguard for Afghanistan’s leadership and has weaponized its false Afghan nationalism, nationalism and suicidal jihadism. This testament has rendered the Taliban a important and unmatched brand in which it offers a sense of belonging to employable pastoral Afghans with the capability and license for direct action.

Make no mistake, Afghanistan’s own distasteful literal history, embedded in the continuing competition between artistic religiosity and euphemism, provides Pakistan the space and security to exploit. This dangerous contest has frequently put the country at a clash with itself.

At present, a broad band of political Islamism permeates Afghan society. Madrassa education is routine in the constructive times across pastoral Afghanistan. Thousands of madrassas remain limited, and utmost operate under accidental mullahs and archconservative Islamic ministers. Worse, there’s an unnatural seductiveness with martyrdom, which requires an adversary. That’s why the Taliban autocrats want Islam as the base of public politics, Afghan identity and legal frame.